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The question whether a criminal defendant is guilty or innocent has been the
subject of renewed attention recently.1  This is a good thing. One of the most
fundamental functions of our criminal justice system is to separate those who have
committed crimes from those who have not. There have been times when our
courts have become so preoccupied with process and privacy issues, with inquiries
remote from questions of guilt or innocence, that the basic purpose of the criminal
justice system has received less attention than it has deserved.
As part of this renaissance of focus upon guilt and innocence, some
commentators have suggested a requirement of corroboration of eyewitness
testimony as a protection against wrongful convictions. The proposal apparently
originated in an article by Professor Sandra Guerra Thompson.3 For some time
now, there has been a consensus that mistaken eyewitness identifications are a
major cause of erroneous convictions, and some of the mechanisms for mistaken
identifications are well understood.4 An eyewitness corroboration rule would
. John B. Neibel Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center; A.B. Harvard
College; J.D. University of Texas.
I In addition to the concern that is the subject of this article, see infra notes 3-5 and
accompanying text, the focus upon guilt or innocence has included such subjects as capital
punishment and post-conviction issues. See, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 522 (2006) (capital
case; procedural default rules do not bar "exceptional" claims such as compelling cases of actual
innocence, even at postconviction stage). In addition, the American Bar Association has added new
language to its model rules placing duties on prosecutors to act upon evidence of innocence at the
post-conviction stage. See ABA House of Delegates Amends Rule Detailing Prosecutors' Duties, 82
CRIM. L. REP. 548 (2008).
2 See, e.g., Criminal Defense Panelists Offer Methods to Prevent, Overturn Wrongful
Convictions, 82 CRIM. L. REP. 548 (2008) (advising "change" away from "motions to suppress or
Batson challenges," toward issues of guilt and innocence). See also Posting of Colin Miller to
EvidenceProf Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof (Apr. 9, 2008) [hereinafter
Posting].
3 Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated
Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 1487 (2008); see also Posting, supra
note 2 (reviewing Thompson and "strongly agree[ing]"). For another, similar proposal, see Boaz
Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Why a Conviction Should Not Be Based on a Single Piece of
Evidence: A Proposal for Reform, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 43 (2007) (arguing for corroboration of all types
of evidence).
4 See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1985) (identifying factors that
"reduce[] ... eyewitnesses' ability to perceive and remember accurately").
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respond to this problem. The proposal as it is usually stated, is a bold one, calling
for an across-the-board requirement of acquittal in most instances in which the
required corroboration is lacking.5 Thus, Professor Thompson's justification for
her proposal appears in an article written in the grand manner, developing the
concept and suggesting but not specifying the details and limits. This is as it
should be. But such an innovation should not be undertaken without a thorough
inventory of its costs as well as its advantages, and that is the purpose of this
article.
The trouble is, the corroboration proposal raises a number of questions, the
answers to which may determine the wisdom of adopting it. What impact will it
have upon the control of crime if it tilts the balance significantly toward acquittal
of guilty persons? Would such an enactment become a kind of Violent Predators
Relief Act? Would it therefore impose harm on innocent people, just as surely as
wrongful convictions do? What do the proponents mean by "corroboration,"
anyway? What exceptions should be made to a corroboration requirement?
Sensibly, proponents recognize that exceptions are needed.6 But the devil is in the
details.
This Commentary largely assumes that the corroboration proposal has merit
and that it would have significant advantages. The first section makes this point.
The essay concentrates, however, upon the question whether such a requirement
can be made workable: in other words, on the issues that it raises, which might
involve significant costs. The following section therefore considers whether a
corroboration requirement would have a disproportionate impact upon certain
kinds of offenses, particularly violent offenses. The third section considers what
kinds of evidence ought to qualify as corroboration. A fourth section considers
whether we as a society have an ethical duty to convict the guilty, and thus protect
innocent persons from crimes, as well as to avoid convicting the innocent; and it
examines the impact that the corroboration proposal might have upon any such
duty. The fifth section considers whether there should be exceptions to an
otherwise absolute requirement, and what they should be.
A final section contains the author's conclusions. These include an
endorsement of the corroboration idea as having significant merit. Much of this
article questions the corroboration proposal and suggests a need for limiting it, but
nothing here is intended to take away from the accomplishment represented by the
proponents' work. The author's further conclusion, however, is that corroboration
should not become the subject of an absolute rule that calls for automatic acquittal,
but that the proposal should be tempered by relatively broad recognition of
corroboration, by exceptions for circumstances in which the risks of mistaken
5 See supra notes 2-3. Professor Thompson's proposal recognizes the need for exceptions,
and hence it applies to "most" but not all cases.
6 For example, Professor Thompson would not apply the proposed rule to eyewitnesses who
knew each other or have a previous relationship. Thompson, supra note 3, at 1541.
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identification are reduced, and by a factual review that takes into account the
ultimate question of sufficient proof of guilt by weighing the evidence.
I. WHAT ARGUMENTS ARE THERE FOR AN EYEWITNESS CORROBORATION
REQUIREMENT?
This article is concerned mainly with the arguments that should limit an
eyewitness corroboration requirement. But before we consider the limits of a
corroboration rule, it makes sense to consider the reasons why such a rule might be
a good idea. The arguments favoring such a requirement have been well stated by
others. The following reasons, however, include several that are not emphasized
in the existing literature, and they add to the arguments made by others.
In the first place, widespread police lineup practices unavoidably create
conditions conducive to mistaken identifications, even if these practices are
sensible and, indeed, necessary. Robbery cases, which probably involve more
lineups than most other categories of crime, involve detective work that is hardly
glamorous, in which officers study offense reports and correlate descriptions of
perpetrators. When an arrest results, the suspect is placed in lineups featuring
witnesses whose descriptions already fit the suspect.8 It would make little sense
for police officers to do otherwise; putting a suspect into lineups for witnesses
whose descriptions vary significantly from him would waste resources, harass
witnesses, and mistreat the suspect. The result, however, is that we ask witnesses
whether they can identify a person in a lineup that contains a suspect fitting the
description that the witnesses have already given. Although this procedure makes
sense, it increases the odds of the mistaken identification of a similar suspect who
is not the perpetrator.
In the second place, it is doubtful whether procedures can be devised that will
dramatically alter this tendency toward error. Commentators have offered many
suggestions. These include sequential lineups, express communication to the
witnesses that the perpetrator may not be present, prevention of suggestion,
double-blind processes, and the like. So far, experimental data have produced
mixed results about whether these alternatives really reduce misidentifications. 9
Further experimentation is warranted, but consideration of other alternatives is also
warranted.
In the third place, eyewitness identification is essential to a functioning
criminal justice system. All criminal convictions depend upon proper
7 See supra notes 2-3.
8 See DAVID CRUMP & WILLIAM J. MERTENS, THE STORY OF A CRIMINAL CASE: THE STATE V.
ALBERT DELMAN GREENE 8-13 (2d ed. 2001) (showing actual lineup procedures and documents
taken from a real case and discussing the danger of misidentification).
9 For example, one experiment with these methods showed that a witness was "more than
three times as likely to pick the wrong person [in a sequential double-blind lineup, with each person
presented individually] as a witness to a simultaneous lineup." Mark Hansen, That's Him!- Or Is
It?, 92 A.B.A. J., Aug. 2006, at 12-13. But the study has been subjected to criticism. Id.
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identification of the defendant as the perpetrator. In many cases, eyewitness
evidence is the main or only evidence that supplies this identification. For all of its
faults, we cannot avoid using this method. At the same time, other types of
evidence-scientific evidence and circumstantial evidence--exhibit serious flaws
as well.' 0
In the fourth place, misidentifications are frequent. My own study of six
capital cases showed that two of them involved serious misidentifications. In one
case, two different witnesses identified police officers who were stand-ins in a
lineup. One eyewitness in the same case identified the victim's husband, who
resembled the perpetrator, and the identification led to the arrest of this innocent
man shortly after he had discovered his wife's murder. In both instances, the
errors were quickly detected, and it is inconceivable that they could have led to
indictment or trial, much less conviction.11  But the probability of other
misidentifications that could lead to conviction is certainly present. One
commentator has found an approximately 3.3%-5% mistaken conviction rate in a
sample of rape-murder cases. I remain skeptical about this conclusion, believing
that for structural reasons we never can attain accurate statistical information.'
3
But the reasons sketched above give ample reason to conclude that mistaken
eyewitness identifications are a major cause of erroneous convictions.
Finally, a requirement of eyewitness corroboration would take advantage of a
powerful logical technique for securing greater accuracy. Specifically, Bayes'
Theorem is a mathematical construct that tells us the increase in probability of the
existence of a fact that is produced by additional independent evidence. Imagine a
robbery case in which we have only 50% confidence in the eyewitness
identifications. But the suspect exhibits a characteristic, independent of the
identifications, that occurs in only 1 in 1000 individuals in the population: for
example, possession of an unusual article, similar to one taken in the robbery.
Bayes' Theorem tells us that our confidence in the evidence now increases
dramatically. We now know that the probability of a random person in the
10 See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
11 DAVID CRUMP & GEORGE JACOBS, A CAPITAL CASE IN AMERICA: How TODAY'S JUSTICE
SYSTEM HANDLES DEATH PENALTY CASES FROM CRIME SCENE TO ULTIMATE EXECUTION OF SENTENCE
233 (2000).
12 D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 762 (2007).
13 My skepticism reflects (among other issues) the assumption in this study that "DNA
exonerations" are accurate enough to support statistical calculations-not just as a measure of unsure
convictions, but of actual innocence. Id. At least one study, however, has found a significant error
rate in DNA results due to laboratory errors. See DAVID CRUMP Er AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES,
STATUTES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 227 (2005) (describing 1 in 200 occurrence of false
positives, with false negatives presumably being higher in frequency). The actual size of this effect is
unknown and probably unknowable, and it could be large enough to erode the statistical significance
of the 3.3%--5% result. It should immediately be added that there are few perfect statistical studies.
This basis for skepticism, even if meritorious, does not negate the force of the study. It merely puts it
in a category with other statistical studies.
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population displaying similarly strong evidence of guilt is approximately 0.001. 14
And this result follows after eyewitness evidence with only a 0.50 probability of
accuracy. Much greater confidence can result if the eyewitness evidence is more
likely to be accurate. An eyewitness corroboration requirement is designed to use
this effect of Bayes' Theorem, and it has great promise for doing so.
These arguments are the case for the corroboration requirement. But a rule
should not be adopted on the sole basis of the arguments for it when opposing
issues remain unexamined. What would be the effect of such a rule on the other
goals of the criminal justice system? Would we increase other kinds of harm to
innocent people? Would some crimes become unprovable? What is meant by
corroboration? What exceptions should there be? And what shape or form should
a rule requiring corroboration take, if one is to be adopted?
H. COULD A CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT BECOME EQUIVALENT TO A
VIOLENT PREDATORS RELIEF ACT?
Consider a hypothetical case, based upon the so-called Virginia Tech
massacre. On April 16, 2007, a student named Seung-Hui Cho entered the campus
of Virginia Polytech Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) in Blacksburg,
Virginia. 15 Cho shot and killed thirty-two people and wounded many more before
committing suicide. The Virginia Tech killings were the deadliest school shooting
16in United States history.
Support for an unqualified corroboration requirement can be tested by
hypothesizing a slightly different case, based on the same massacre. Imagine that
Cho had made his escape, as many violent predators do. Imagine that he had
wiped down and successfully disposed of his weapons, or destroyed them.
Imagine that Cho had then been brought to justice, in a trial at which the witnesses
were those who observed him in the act of killing, including people wounded at
close range. In such a case, would not a corroboration requirement mean that the
judge would be forced to withdraw the case from the jury and grant an automatic
judgment of acquittal?
If one thinks about the kinds of cases that would be affected by an eyewitness
corroboration requirement, one probably will come to the conclusion that crimes of
violence would most often call for per se acquittals. One can imagine, for
example, the strategic rapist, robber, or serial murderer. This purposeful individual
may learn not to worry about the presence of eyewitnesses and to worry instead
about preventing any evidence of his presence from remaining at the scene, as well
as getting rid of all fruits and implements of the crime. A law about eyewitness
14 For a discussion of Bayes' Theorem, together with a chart showing antecedent and revised
probabilities, see CRUMP ET AL., supra note 13, at 225-27.
15 See Wikipedia, Virginia Tech Massacre,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilVirginiaTechMassacre (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
16 id.
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corroboration should be written so as to make it difficult for the strategic predator
to benefit from these methods.
III. WHAT IS MEANT BY "CORROBORATION"?
As an assistant district attorney, I once tried a case involving a homicide that
occurred in a bar, but in which the defendant had been arrested while walking
home. 17  A number of individuals inside the bar were able to identify the
defendant, and they did so at trial. The defendant's firearm was never recovered.
No one in the bar claimed to be acquainted with the defendant, but he had
distinctive features, and the jury believed that the eyewitnesses were credible. The
fact that the defendant was arrested while walking between the bar and his home
was introduced into evidence, but he could have been walking home from
someplace else.
In such a case, what do we mean by "corroboration"? The first issue of note
is whether one eyewitness can corroborate another eyewitness. If the answer is
yes, the efficacy of the corroboration requirement is significantly reduced, because
it is probable that in such circumstances the chances of mistake apply uniformly to
all eyewitnesses. Then, what about the defendant's location at the time of his
arrest? Is that sufficient as corroboration? Finding a person walking in the
direction of his home and away from the scene of a crime does not sound like a
circumstance that should be given great weight as evidence.
This particular dilemma, which is concealed within the general idea of a
corroboration requirement, is well known to statisticians. One cannot
simultaneously minimize both Type I errors (false positives) and Type II errors
(false negatives). 18 The requirements that the jury find proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that the judge ensure that there is sufficient evidence to carry
this burden before letting the jury decide, are rules that minimize Type I errors
(mistaken convictions) while vastly increasing Type II errors (mistaken
acquittals). 19 The proposed eyewitness corroboration requirement would greatly
enhance this effect, probably more than any other single rule we now enforce. And
here is the point. The effect across different categories of crimes would not be the
same. If we insist upon corroboration that, taken by itself, provides strong
evidence of the perpetrator's identity, we will acquit violent predators
disproportionately and subject innocent people to future violent crimes. On the
other hand, if we adopt such a broad and loose definition of what is sufficient as
17 The defendant's conviction, which occurred too many years ago to make its documentation
reasonable, did not result in an appeal, and as is the case with most criminal justice determinations, it
is not memorialized by any published authority.
18 See DAVID CRUMP, How TO REASON ABOUT THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
TO THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 426 (2001) (explaining the "tradeoff' between these errors).
19 See id. (explaining that minimizing Type I errors in convictions, by a high proof burden,
inevitably increases Type II errors, in the form of erroneous acquittals).
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corroboration that "walking-home evidence" suffices,2 0 we may dilute the
proposal.
Some states that have imposed corroboration requirements in certain cases2 l
have applied these requirements so that two eyewitnesses subject to the
requirement cannot corroborate each other.22 The meaning of that rule would be
that the Virginia Tech massacre case hypothesized above, in which the perpetrator
is identified by multiple eyewitnesses but leaves no physical evidence of himself
and destroys the implements of the crime, would enjoy an automatic acquittal. On
the other hand, corroboration requirements have generally been interpreted so that
relatively loose circumstantial evidence will suffice. The corroborative
information need not convincingly tie the defendant to the crime; it only needs to
provide an additional circumstance pointing in that general direction.23 Some
states, in order to satisfy the corroboration requirement, have broadly admitted
evidence of other crimes even when these extraneous offenses would not normally
be admissible. 24 For example, notwithstanding Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) or
its equivalent, a robbery that includes corroborative evidence of the identity of the
perpetrator of a robbery-murder would become admissible in the trial of the
robbery-murder. Thus, whether we should look for corroboration by relaxing Rule
404(b) is a question that is raised by the corroboration proposal.
It is worth adding that no category of evidence is perfect. And just as there is
skepticism about eyewitness evidence, there is skepticism about other kinds of
evidence. Sometimes, courts have ordered acquittals in cases involving very
strong circumstantial evidence, of a kind that seemingly furnishes more than
sufficient proof.25 And scientific evidence is vulnerable to laboratory errors. Even
20 See supra text accompanying note 17.
21 See 23 C. J. S. Criminal Law § 1375 (2009) (stating that when corroboration of accomplice
eyewitness testimony is required, insufficiency of the one accomplice's testimony to corroborate
another's testimony is the "general rule").
22 Consider TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.14 (Vernon 2005) [hereinafter TEX. CODE],
which provides that a conviction "cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless
corroborated by other evidence .... ." The courts apply this rule by "eliminat[ing] from
consideration" the testimony of any accomplices and then considering whether there is other evidence
that "tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense." Reed v. State, 744 S.W.2d
112, 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
23 The cases vary, with some requiring relatively substantial corroboration and others
requiring much less. Compare Barnes v. State, 62 S.W.3d 288, 301 (Tex. App. 2001) (stating that
"[e]ven apparently insignificant evidence" can be enough), with Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315,
323 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (requiring corroboration that makes the accomplice testimony
"more likely [true] than not"). The latter standard has been overruled in favor of a standard that
requires only that the evidence "tend[s] to connect the defendant with the offense committed." TEX.
CODE, supra note 22.
24 See Ramirez v. State, No. 03-05-00219-CR, 2006 WL 2449433, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 25,
2006) (unpublished memorandum opinion).
25 See, e.g., Stogsdill v. State, 552 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (ordering acquittal in
case without eyewitness but with very strong circumstantial evidence). For suggestions that the court
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DNA evidence, with its seemingly staggering statistical estimates, is only as good
as experimental errors allow it to be, and these potential errors can mean that the
statistical estimates are meaningless.26 Proof by mathematics has been vigorously
criticized,27 sometimes in ways that seem inaccurate.28 Ironically, in fact, the
courts show a subtle preference for eyewitness testimony rather than for other
kinds of evidence, and it is this tendency that the corroboration requirement is
intended to limit.29 But here is the point. There is corroboration and then there is
corroboration; and some of it is good, some not so good. Most of the time, we can
point to some circumstance as "corroborating" an eyewitness under at least some
set of assumptions that a juror might accept.30 The real question, then, is not so
much whether an eyewitness corroboration requirement would produce useful
results-it would-but rather, what we are willing to consider as fulfilling the
requirement, in what kinds of cases.
These are not criticisms of the general idea of an eyewitness corroboration
requirement. Every useful legal doctrine requires definition more specific than its
underlying policy. In other words, every legal rule requires adjustments that
mitigate its worst side effects, and this article is merely an attempt to examine
those issues in the case of the eyewitness corroboration proposal.
in Stogsdill failed to apply the evidentiary standard correctly and was overly suspicious of the
evidence, see CRUMP Er AL., supra note 13, at 222.
26 See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 13, at 223-27 (discussing limitations of DNA evidence).
27 See People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968) (reversing conviction based on probabilistic
evidence and arguments).
28 Collins, for example, is based on three alleged fallacies in the evidence: (1) lack of
complete "independence" in the factors used to estimate probabilities, (2) the estimation of the
numbers used, and (3) the character of the result as showing not a probability of guilt but only the
probability of random defendants exhibiting the observed characteristics. The trouble with labeling
these arguments as fallacies is that the numbers were never presented to the jury as more than
estimates, no natural phenomenon is likely to exhibit complete independence, and it was never
suggested to the jury that the evidence showed an actual probability of guilt but merely an example of
useful reasoning. Furthermore, the evidence could have been of value to the jury in understanding
and assessing the evidence. For a discussion of both sides of this issue, see PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN ET
AL., EVIDENCE: CASE, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 490-98 (3d ed. 2006).
29 See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 13, at 227-28.
30 See supra notes 17, 19 and accompanying text (giving example of "corroboration"
consisting of evidence that defendant was arrested while walking home from the general direction of
the crime scene and suggesting that accepting this evidence as sufficient might make the proposal
meaningless).
[Vol 7:361
EYEWITNESS CORROBORATION REQUIREMENTS
IV. Is THERE A BALANCE BETWEEN THE GOALS OF ACQUITrING THE INNOCENT
AND CONVICTING THE GUILTY?
A. Is There a Duty to Do Both?
Proponents of an eyewitness corroboration requirement emphasize the
importance of acquitting the innocent. Obviously, the ethical duty of a society to
minimize conviction of those who are not guilty is widely recognized. It may also
be useful, however, to give at least some attention to the question whether
protecting the innocent from future crimes by the guilty is an ethical duty.
The unfortunate fact is that some societies have oppressed innocent people by
underprosecuting particular crimes, and they still do. The key thing to realize here
is that a state policy favoring erroneous acquittal results in uneven protection of
different classes of people. Preferred groups will be disproportionately free of the
costs created by either erroneous acquittal or erroneous conviction, and the costs of
unredressed crime will fall upon disfavored groups. Kristallnacht, or the "Night of
Broken Glass," was among the early events that set the Holocaust in motion. The
policy of the Nazi regime was to tolerate crimes of vandalism or worse against
Jewish people.31 One can conclude that in doing so, the society acted unethically.
In the United States, the Ku Klux Klan Act was a response to the failure of the
States to provide protection to innocent people against violent crimes.
32
Historically (and arguably still), this country has made crimes of child abuse and
rape extraordinarily difficult to prosecute, with corroboration requirements
figuring prominently in the reasons.33 Still today, it is easy to make the argument
that our treatment of crimes against children is unethical. Parents vote and hire
lawyers; children do not. The result is that we have accepted arguments tilted
toward protecting parents over abused children. Multiple privileges, rules that
exclude reliable evidence, and principles that make the detection of crimes difficult
are among the reasons.34
B. The Harm Caused by Erroneous Judgments: Conviction of the Innocent and
Acquittal of the Guilty
One factor in considering the ethical issues caused by mistaken judgments is
to compare the harm caused by mistaken convictions to mistaken acquittals. The
disadvantages attributable to erroneous convictions may seem obvious, but they
are worth examining in the context of concrete cases. On the other hand, the harm
31 See Wikipedia, Kristallnacht, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kristallnacht (last visited Apr.
14, 2009).
32 See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 13, at 216 (discussing the ethical duties of society, with
description of this example).
33 See id.
34 See id.
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caused by erroneous acquittals is less direct and obvious, but nevertheless real, and
it also bears examination.
35
Consider a typical case of misidentification. Two rape victims picked
William Jackson out of a police lineup in 1977. A jury convicted Jackson, and he
began serving a sentence of 14 to 50 years.36 Five years later, officers arrested a
loitering suspect wearing a ski mask with an array of burglary tools. He turned out
to be Dr. Edward Jackson, who was an unlikely arrestee: a prominent local
internist. 37 A search of the second Jackson's car revealed a long list of rape
victims, suggesting that he was the "Granville rapist," suspected of nearly one
hundred assaults, including the two for which William Jackson had been
sentenced. William Jackson was released seven hours after Dr. Edward Jackson
was indicted. The newly freed prisoner declined to criticize the mistaken
witnesses, saying, "It ain't their fault," but he was understandably critical of the
system that had convicted him.38
In such a case, there are both obvious and hidden losses. 39 There is the
interest of the convicted or arrested person. William Jackson was stabbed and
repeatedly assaulted during his imprisonment and said, "They took away part of
my life, part of my youth. I spent five years down there, and all they said was
'We're sorry."' 40 Then, too, there is the interest of the victims. The factually
guilty person, who is still at large, may continue to commit further crimes. One
can even argue that some criminals suffer losses themselves from not being
stopped before their crimes multiply or escalate in severity. Obviously, future
victims of similar offenses, survivors or families of each of these people, and other
affected people, are harmed by a wrongful conviction. So are citizens in the
community and the body politic, as various kinds of indirect harm continue while
the wrong person is convicted and the actual perpetrator is loose, including an
obviously important factor: people's willingness to follow the law, enforce the law,
and respect the law. Public doubts arise, along with confusion about what would
otherwise be strongly held faith in the system. Everyone has read about cases such
as William Jackson's in their newspapers, and it is difficult to know how many
such cases actually exist that do not appear in the newspapers.
Let us also consider a case of erroneous acquittal. One example is the
nightmarish case of Zachary Thomas Langley.41 Langley was arrested for murder,
and while in jail away from drugs, he apparently became remorseful. He
35 The text and authorities in the following paragraphs borrow somewhat from CRUMP ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 210-15.
36 See "We're Sorry": A Case of Mistaken Identity, TIME, Oct. 4, 1982, at 45 [hereinafter
"We're Sorry'].
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 See generally CRUMPET AL., supra note 13, at 215-16 (discussing these losses).
40 See "We're Sorry", supra note 36.
41 See CRUMPET AL., supra note 13, at 210-11. "Langley" is a pseudonym.
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confessed to the murder to an assistant district attorney and also to his heroin
supplier. The murder itself was shockingly brutal and cruel. The body of the
victim, a young woman who lived in an apartment near Langley, was discovered
nude in a pool of blood. The crime scene photograph showed her to have been
savagely beaten. Perhaps the most disturbing detail was a broom handle with a
wire in its tip that had the victim's blood and flesh on it. An autopsy showed that
the broom handle, with the wire, had been inserted into the victim's vagina.
At trial, the principal evidence identifying Langley as the killer consisted of
the testimony of the Assistant District Attorney and of Langley's heroin supplier.
The alleged confessions contained various details, some of which were not general
public knowledge, but the two witnesses' accounts dovetailed. No fingerprints or
other evidence were found, however, to link Langley to the crime scene, and he did
not testify. The jury acquitted. After trial, the jurors explained that they doubted
the testimony of the prosecutor because, well, he was an Assistant District
Attorney. They doubted the testimony of Langley's drug supplier because he was
a drug dealer.
Promptly after his release, Langley broke into the residence of another young
woman and assaulted her. This crime, too, was brutal. Langley fractured the
victim's jaw and injured her in other ways. He tied the victim to her bed and set
the mattress on fire. The crime scene photographs included close-ups of the
blackened, charred hands of the victim and other burned parts of her body. But
this victim survived, and she identified Langley.
Arguably, the harm caused by an erroneous acquittal in a case such as
Langley's is significant. They include impairments of the interests of the first
victim, the second victim, the survivors of both, nearby residents, citizens
generally, and the body politic. A different jury probably would have convicted
Langley the first time, and the suffering of the second victim would have been
prevented. In fact, one might consider the possibility that future innocent persons,
arrested and falsely accused, could suffer harm from Langley's acquittal, in the
form of an increased tendency to convict among citizens aware of wrongful
acquittals.
This case may have relevance to the proposal of an eyewitness corroboration
requirement. Would the proponents support the automatic acquittal of Langley in
the second case, too, without allowing a jury even to consider his guilt or
innocence? Langley did not leave fingerprints or other corroborative evidence at
either crime scene, and the circumstances, such as his nearby residence, furnished
only the thinnest of support of the eyewitness identification. Would proponents of
a corroboration requirement agree to the relaxation of Rule 404(b) to allow the
defendant's confessions in the first case to corroborate the identification in the
second case (since most people would infer the existence of corroboration from
this evidence)? 42 And finally, don't we as a society have an ethical duty at some
42 Cf supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the 404(b) issue).
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point to Langley's third victim, or fourth, or fifth, or twentieth, to protect them
better?
C. The "n Controversy": To Prevent a Single Erroneous Conviction, How Many
Guilty Persons Should Be Acquitted?
One of the best law review articles ever written on any subject is Alexander
("Sasha") Volokh's "n Guilty Men."4  Volokh describes the "n controversy,"
beginning with a pronouncement of William Blackstone that has become known as
the Blackstone Ratio: "[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
innocent suffer." 44  But why a ratio of 10:1, Volokh asks? This question
introduces the factor he calls "n": the number of guilty people who ought to be
released to prevent the conviction of one innocent person. Different people want
different values of n. After all, Benjamin Franklin thought "[t]hat it is better that a
hundred guilty persons should escape than one innocent person should suffer.
45
Volokh builds a catalog of references to common numbers such as one, five,
twelve, twenty, "hundreds," one thousand, and five thousand, which courts or
commentators have plugged in as values for n.46
A simplistic approach might regard very high or even infinite values of n as
giving a "warm fuzzy feeling," but Volokh provides ample support for skepticism
about this conclusion. He quotes Jeremy Bentham:
[W]e must be on our guard against those sentimental exaggerations
which tend to give crime impunity .... Public applause has been, so to
speak, set up to auction. At first it was said to be better to save several
guilty men, than to condemn a single innocent man; others . . . fix the
number ten; a third made this ten a hundred, and a fourth made it a
thousand. All these candidates... have been outstripped by ... writers,
who hold, that, in no case, ought an accused person to be condemned,
unless evidence amount to mathematical or absolute certainty.
According to this maxim, nobody ought to be punished, lest an innocent
man be punished.47
Volokh also sees "a golden age of n-skepticism" in Britain, thanks, perhaps,
to the efforts of the Irish Republican Army. Thus, "[o]ne British writer asks what
use n = 10 is 'if those [ten] guilty men use their freedom to plant a bomb that kills
43 Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173 (1997).
44 Id. at 174 (citing 4 WiLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352).
45 Id. at 175 (citing Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan (Mar. 14, 1785), in
1 I THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 11, 13 (John Bigelow ed., fed. ed. 1904) (emphasis added).
4' Id. at 175, 187-88.
47 Id. at 195.
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[a hundred] school children."'' 48 And then, just to turn the tables on the British,
Volokh tells the story of a Chinese law professor, who listened to a British lawyer
explain why it was better that ninety-nine guilty men go free than that one innocent
man be executed. "The Chinese professor thought for a second and asked, 'Better
for whom?' ' 49 Volokh even quotes from The Godfather: "Mario Puzo's Don
Clericuzio heard about letting a hundred guilty men go free and, '[s]truck almost
dumb by the beauty of the concept . . . became an ardent patriot. ' ' ' 50 In other
words, high values of n do amount to a Violent Predator's Relief Act, at least in
literature.
There are those who believe that the solution to the n controversy is simple:
"Just convict all the guilty and acquit all the innocent, say letter writers, state
supreme courts, Ulysses S. Grant, and the Chinese."51 Volokh's article reminds us,
however, that this solution is incomplete, to put the matter charitably. We have to
have process. And every valid principle, as well as every filigree or ornament that
we put upon the process, tilts the value of n, whether we like it or not.
Again, it is impossible simultaneously to minimize both Type I errors (false
positives) and Type II errors (false negatives), 52 at least without obtaining better
data. One point that emerges clearly from Volokh's analysis is that every
determination of guilt or innocence is, and always will be, a compromise between
these two goals. Anyone who wishes the problem away, by advocating merely that
we convict the guilty and acquit the innocent, really is refusing to come to grips
with the problem.
V. EXCEPTIONS TO THE CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT
The existing doctrines controlling other kinds of corroboration requirements
suggest that exceptions to such a requirement may be necessary in the eyewitness
case, too. For example, some jurisdictions require corroboration of "accomplice
witnesses., 53 A participant in the crime who testifies against a co-participant must
be supported by other circumstances suggesting guilt, in order to furnish legally
sufficient evidence. It is easy to see that such a corroboration requirement may
have positive results. But for differing reasons, these jurisdictions have been
48 Id. at 197 (quoting Peregrine Worsthorne, We Are All Guilty, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(London), Mar. 24, 1991, at 22).
49 Id. at 211.
50 Id. at 175 (quoting MARIO Puzo, THE LAST DON 58 (1996)).
51 Id. at 209.
52 Cf CRUMP ET AL., supra note 13, at 209-10 (discussing inevitable effect of every process
decision on the value of n).
53 See generally AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 1408 (2008) (discussing the general rule, adopted in
"many jurisdictions"). See, e.g., TEx. CODE, supra note 22. See also supra notes 13-15 (discussing
the meaning of this requirement).
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persuaded to create exceptions, because the corroboration requirement otherwise
would make whole categories of crime unprosecutable.
For example, consider the crime of receiving stolen property. Often, it is
impossible to obtain a conviction in such a case without the testimony of the thief
who sold the property to the receiver. If the only corroboration requirement is of
the defendant's participation in the transaction, corroboration requirements may
not be difficult to meet; the problem arises, however, if a jurisdiction insists upon
corroboration of evidence that the receiver knew that the property was stolen.
Generally, the only evidence is the thief's testimony about the transaction or its
particulars. Given this difficulty, some jurisdictions have created an exception:
accomplice testimony usually must be corroborated, but not in cases of receiving
stolen property.54 Another example, perhaps even more convincing, is furnished
by the crime of compelling prostitution. The proof of some crime elements is
likely to rest on the uncorroborated testimony of the prostitute who is the
ostensible victim, but that person, unfortunately, is also literally an accomplice.
Therefore, an exception to the accomplice corroboration requirement is needed for
the crime of compelling prostitution,55 if we are to enforce the law at all.
What exceptions might be appropriate in the case of an eyewitness
corroboration requirement? Recognizing the problem, Professor Thompson offers
at least one example: she would not impose the corroboration requirement if the
eyewitness "knows" the defendant from a "previous relationship., 56 Without this
sensible exception, the corroboration requirement would have many unintended
results. For example, domestic violence cases might become virtually
unprosecutable. The victim may be the only eyewitness, and typically,
corroboration of her identification of the perpetrator will be lacking.
The problem remains, however: what does it mean for the witness to "know"
the defendant? I once had a case in which the accused perpetrator of an assault
was a deliveryman who had transported furniture to the victim's residence earlier
in the day.57 Did the eyewitness, then, "know" the defendant? Probably not, if the
words "know" and "relationship" are taken in their usual senses. And if not, are
the similar facial features of the two individuals sufficient to provide
"corroboration"? Again, probably not, unless we are to minimize the
corroboration requirement. The deliveryman's crime, otherwise, becomes
unprosecutable.
An exception for eyewitnesses who "know" the defendant conforms to
common sense, but writing it into law in a way that would distinguish cases
reliably would be difficult. And I wonder whether other exceptions may be
54 See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(b)(2) (Vernon 2003) (allowing uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice to prove defendant's knowledge or intent).
55 See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.06 (Vernon 2003).
56 Thompson, supra note 3, at 1541.
57 This case, like the one described in note 17 above, was not memorialized, and the
documents are unavailable.
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needed. Should there be an exception if the defendant is reliably identified by
some unique facial detail? Are there some kinds of offenses that should be taken
out of the proposed rule, as there are in the case of accomplice corroboration
requirements? The devil is in the details.
VI. CONCLUSION
It seems likely that mistaken convictions could be reduced by a rule
depending upon the presence or absence of eyewitness corroboration.
Identification evidence is subject to recognized types of errors, and these errors
probably account for a large percentage of erroneous convictions. Unfortunately,
however, a flat rule requiring corroboration would have unpredictable but surely
disadvantageous side effects. It would reduce convictions of the guilty as well.
And such a rule might result disproportionately in automatic acquittals of violent
predators. Those kinds of mistaken judgments would oppress innocent victims just
as surely as erroneous acquittals would. One might be tempted to draw a
distinction between these two types of errors, by asserting that the affirmative
conduct of the state in imprisoning a person who is not guilty is worse than the
inaction that permits a predator to impose future suffering upon innocent victims.
But at some point, the side effects of a deliberate choice for an increase in
erroneous acquittals becomes serious enough to create an imbalance, in which the
inaction of the state, which facilitates suffering inflicted by acquitted guilty people,
becomes an ethical lapse itself.
Therefore, the problem may not be one of deciding whether a corroboration
rule would be desirable, but rather one of deciding what significance to give to
corroboration. For example, can one eyewitness furnish sufficient corroboration of
another? Should there be a two-eyewitness exception? States with other kinds of
corroboration requirements do not always accept the two-witness idea; they reason
that one affected witness should not corroborate another. The trouble is, a rule that
strictly limited the permissible types of corroboration would have more negative
effects than one that broadly considered many different forms of qualifying
evidence. This principle leads to the argument that the two-eyewitness case should
be sufficient to submit to the jury. But there are reasons for the contrary
conclusion. If the factors known to enhance mistaken identifications are present
for one witness, they likely are present for other eyewitnesses too, and a two-
witness exception might undermine the benefits of the corroboration requirement.
Then, too, there is the question whether evidence of very slight weight should
furnish corroboration, such as the fact that the defendant is found walking away
from the general direction of the crime and toward his home. Furthermore, there is
the question, if we require corroboration, of whether we should look to other
generally similar crimes committed by the same defendant. A Bayesian analysis
suggests that evidence of this kind would furnish powerful corroboration, but one
suspects that the proponents of the corroboration requirement may not be willing to
relax prohibitions such as that in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
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Next, there is the question of necessary exceptions. The recognition that there
should be an exception for an eyewitness who "knows" the perpetrator is obvious
to proponents, and indeed, disastrous results would follow otherwise; but how do
we write this idea into a rule? The real issue is whether the witness has seen the
other person enough to make a reliable identification, but that is a vague standard.
It begs the question, in fact. The issue then resembles asking whether there is
evidence from which a jury could find proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Beyond
the "known perpetrator" question, should there be an exception for identifications
bolstered by a sufficiently unique physical characteristic, such as an unusual tattoo,
a birthmark, a scar, or a broken nose? That approach, too, begins to fade into
Never-Never Land if it requires merely a sufficiently unique physical
characteristic, because everyone's combination of features is unique.
Perhaps the best way to embody a corroboration requirement into a rule is,
first, to require a reviewing court to consider the factual as well as the legal
sufficiency of the evidence. Some states impose this requirement upon their
courts, requiring them to go beyond the standard for legal sufficiency and to weigh
the strength of the evidence factually and holistically. And then, the rule could
direct the court to consider specifically, in cases involving eyewitness
identifications, whether the presence or absence of corroborating evidence
undermines the jury's finding of guilt. This proposal might avoid many
convictions based upon mistaken testimony. It calls for a more modest step than a
flat rule. But given the uncertainty of the answers to questions raised by a more
dramatic proposal-a proposal that would treat uncorroborated eyewitness
testimony as automatically insufficient-perhaps a more modest approach is
preferable, at least as a first step.
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